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Abstract
We compare the probability of different warming rates to their mentions in IPCC reports through
text mining. We find that there is a substantial mismatch between likely warming rates and research
coverage. 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C scenarios are substantially overrepresented. More likely higher end
warming scenarios of 3 ◦C and above, despite potential catastrophic impacts, are severely neglected.
1. Introduction
Temperature rise of 3 ◦C above pre-industrial
temperature is more likely than not by the end of
the century, on most business as usual scenario. One
recent estimate projected a rise of 2.0 ◦C–4.9 ◦C with
a median of 3.2 ◦C (Raftery et al 2017). This covers
likely ranges; however, climate change is heavy-tailed
with surprisingly high likelihoods for high levels of
warming. GHG concentrations of 700 ppm could
produce a 10% chance of exceeding a temperature
rise of 6 ◦C (Wagner andWeitzman 2015). Such con-
centrations would be passed by 2100 under six of the
nine of theCMIP6 SSP-RF baseline and 6.0W/m2 for-
cing scenarios (Riahi et al 2017, Gidden et al 2019).
The most recent estimates of equilibrium climate
sensitivity show a similar distribution, narrowing the
range of outcomes to exclude rises below 2 ◦C but
not ruling out warming above 4.5 ◦C (Sherwood
et al 2020).
Lower concentrations could still end in higher end
warming outcomes due to tipping points and uncer-
tainty over Earth system feedbacks and nonlinearit-
ies (Oreskes et al 1994, Booth et al 2012, Bodman
et al 2013, Lenton et al 2019). These uncertainties
make higher end warming climate change even more
dangerous, as they leave the option open for far
worse outcomes (Weitzman 2012).While concerning,
such probabilistic distributions are not the same
as the spread of risk. The impacts of higher tem-
perature ranges are both more uncertain but also
likely to be disproportionately more severe (New
et al 2011). Given that eventual temperature out-
comes also depend on deeply uncertain factors like
the amount of global cooperation to mitigate climate
change, scientists can support policymakers to craft
robust, long-term responses to climate change by
exploring a wide range of plausible futures, through
approaches like Robust Decision-Making (Lempert
et al 2003). This makes understanding the effects
and consequences of warming of 3 ◦C and above
imperative.
While there have been some valuable attempts to
summarize available research (Wagner andWeitzman
2015, Wallace-Wells 2019), calls for action (Lenton
et al 2019) and research projects focused on higher
end climate impacts such as the HELIX project, it
remains unclear if existing research coverage matches
either the probabilistic or risk distribution of cli-
mate change. The best synthesis of climate change
research are the assessment and special reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). They reflect
expert consensus and are a reliable proxy for the cur-
rent state of knowledge. To assess the focus of the
IPCC on different warming scenarios in temperatures
we text-mine available IPCC reports (IPCC 2013,
2014a, 2014b, 2018, 2019a, 2019b) and count how
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Figure 1. Comparison of the probability of temperatures rises and occurrences of those temperatures in the IPCC for (a) all AR5
working group reports and all special reports until 2020; (b) all reports of (a) except the Special Report on 1.5 ◦C warming;
(c) the sum of all temperatures of 3 ◦C and above (based on a)); (d) the sum of all temperatures of 6 ◦C and above (based on a)).
Subfigures (c) and (d) show the cumulative probability (black) of exceeding 3 ◦C change (c) and 6 ◦C (d) as substantially higher
than the relative occurrence (orange) of those temperatures in the IPCC reports. The probability curves and the cumulative
probability are based on the estimates of Wagner and Weitzman (2015).
often the different temperatures are mentioned in
comparison to the probability of the temperatures
projected for an increase of atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations of 550 and 700 ppm based on the research
of Wagner and Weitzman (Wagner and Weitzman
2015). We focus on those concentrations as 700 ppm
are commonly exceeded end-of-century through-
out many of the CMIP6 analytical scenarios, while
550 ppm would be reached if all currently stated cli-
mate policies and plans would be implemented (IEA
2020).
2. Results and discussion
Our results show a large mismatch between the
amount of research and the probability of warm-
ing (figure 1(a)). 3 ◦C is the peak of probability for
700 ppm, but accounts for less than 3% of mentions.
Temperatures of 3 ◦C or above (figure 1(c)) account
for around two-thirds of the probabilistic mass for
700 ppm, but just over 10% of mentions. Similarly,
a more dramatic temperature rise of 6 ◦C and above
(figure 1(d)) is a 10% probability and only less than
1% of mentions. The picture is slightly better for
550 ppm, but higher end warming climate changes
are underrepresented there as well. In addition, those
numbers are likely to be underestimates of the neg-
lectedness of higher end temperature rise, as many of
the textual references donot refer to a change in global
mean surface temperature. Overall, the percentage of
true positive findings that actually relate to a change
in globalmean air temperature change varies substan-
tially depending on the temperature (between 5 ◦C
and 10 ◦C), ranging from 0% for 10 ◦C to 57% for
7 ◦C. However, even those mostly refer to the tem-
perature change since the last glacial maximum and
possible values for the equilibrium climate sensitiv-
ity. For example, the AR5 report of working group II
(IPCC 2014a) mentions 8 ◦C only three times, two of
which relate to local temperature increases in the arc-
tic and the thermal optimum of salmon.
There is a stark difference betweenwarming prob-
abilities and our knowledge. Over half of the textual
references focus on a warming of 1.5 ◦C. This may
be skewed by the 2018 ‘The Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5 ◦C (SR15)’ (IPCC 2018) which was
requested by the Conference of the Parties (COP)
to the UNFCCC at the 2015 Paris Climate Summit.
When we remove the special report on 1.5 ◦C warm-
ing (IPCC 2018) (figure 1(b)) from our analysis, tex-
tual references to 1.5 ◦C drop, but are still markedly
higher than the probability andmentions of scenarios
higher than 4 ◦C. Our text mining results suggest that
there is at least some research focused on 4 ◦C of
warming. This is supported by its coverage in well-
known grey literature, such as theWorld Bank’s ‘Turn
Down the Heat’ series as well as the 2009 ‘4 Degrees
and Beyond International Climate Conference’.
Our study indicates possible knowledge gaps in
higher end warming climate change research. It is not
a definitive conclusion, but a useful starting point to
discuss the divergence between probability and risk
distributions and climate change research focus to
date. Our method only delivers a snapshot into the
current climate change research and has some limita-
tions. Mentions in IPCC reports do not neatly map
onto the exact frequency of research. Furthermore,
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Figure 2. Probabilities of warming for CO2 concentrations from 400 to 1000 ppm (based on Wagner and Weitzman (2015)) and
the relative occurrence of this warming in the IPCC reports for all AR5 working groups and all special reports until 2020
(both in %). The probability for the temperatures refer to the shown value±0.25 ◦C.
the frequency of mentions says little about the qual-
ity or extent of individual studies. The subject of
IPCC special reports are often as reflective of polit-
ical requests as research needs. Moreover, we use one
prominent 2015 estimate of the probabilistic distribu-
tion of concentrations and temperatures, but future
studies could look to use others (or even a combina-
tion of them). There are also other ways to approach
our analysis that might result in different numbers
(Brown and Caldeira 2017). We searched in Web of
Science and Google Scholar for ‘Climate Change’ and
‘X ◦C’, The results have a very similar distribution to
our IPCC-based results, but it is difficult to settle on
concrete numbers, due to a high, but hard to quantify
rate of false positive results, especially at higher tem-
peratures. To address the rate of false positives in our
analysis we looked at all temperature mentions in
IPCC reports between 5 ◦C and 10 ◦C and checked
if they were referring to global mean temperature rise
or something else. We found no discernible trend in
the rate of false positives.
There are multiple reasons to believe that the res-
ults presented here are robust. First, given the sheer
difference in magnitude of our results, especially for
700 ppm. Second, the gap we highlight in our res-
ults is relatively insensitive to the CO2 concentra-
tion used. Even at CO2 concentrations of 600 ppm
there is still a large research gap higher end warm-
ing. The research focus and the probability of warm-
ing only overlap around 450 ppm if we include all
reports or at 550 ppm if we exclude the 1.5 ◦C spe-
cial report (figures 1(a), (b) and 2). However, given
that currently CO2 concentrations are already above
410 ppm it seems unlikely that we will be able to limit
our greenhouse gas emissions to such levels without
radical systemic socioeconomic changes. Higher end
temperature rise is neglected while research that is
‘betting on the best case’ of 1.5 ◦C or 2 ◦C prolifer-
ates. Third, the IPCC itself has previously noted in
the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) that quantitative
estimates of aggregate impacts above 3 ◦C are rare
(IPCC 2014b). This is echoed in summaries of cli-
mate science in popular literature, which has to rely
on less literature for scenarios above 3 ◦C and just a
few, more speculative geological studies for 6 ◦C and
higher (Lynas 2020). However, it should be noted that
the research gap is a larger issue in the impact reports.
There are several potential reasons for this diver-
gence between probability and risk in relation to
actual research. The most obvious is that the research
community is simply meeting the demands of policy-
makers. The goal of limiting warming to 2 ◦C first was
formally adopted under the 2010 Cancun Accords,
before being enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, alongside the aspirational goal
of holding warming to 1.5 ◦C. Both of these temper-
ature goals are significantly overrepresented in exist-
ing research according to our study. The divergence
may also partially reflect the conservative outcomes
of the consensus procedures of the IPCC, and the
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tendency of climate science to err on the side of ‘least
drama’. This in turn is likely shaped by a history
of climate scientists being accused of alarmism by
well-fundedmisinformation campaigns (Oreskes and
Conway 2012).
Regardless of the explanation, the problem of a
misalignment between research coverage and probab-
ility and risk persists. Why is there a special report for
1.5 ◦C warming, but none for a warming of 3 ◦C and
above, even though the latter currently seems more
probable and would be more impactful? We hope this
paper provides a starting point for discussion on how
research should coincidewith future probabilities and
risks. Such a conversation and realignment of pri-
orities is overdue. It is also direly needed given that
the heavy-tails of climate change could constitute a
threat of global catastrophe or even human extinction
(Lynas 2020, Ord 2020).
3. Methods
To count the temperature mentioned in the IPCC
reports (IPCC 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2018, 2019a,
2019b) all text was extracted from the PDFs of the full
reports. The text was then mined for the mentions of
the temperatures in the format ‘X◦C’. The warming
probability was calculated from the probability dens-
ity function of figure 3.2 in Climate Shock (Wagner
and Weitzman 2015), which was graciously provided
by Gernot Wagner. The probability of the temperat-
ures in figure 2 of this paper refers to the probabil-
ity of the temperature ±0.25 ◦C. All code and data
used can be found at the repository of this paper (Jehn
2021). This also contains lists that show how often
the temperatures were found in the individual IPCC
reports.
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